On Neil Warnock and Cardiff's 'anti-football' success

It's been a pretty busy year for me so I've not had the time to dedicate to this blog, but with the big game coming up on Sunday the @DerbyCountyBlog asked me for something on Cardiff this season.

I got rather carried away and so here's my thoughts on Cardiff's season so far. You can read the abridged version, along with the Derby perspective on The Derby County Blog.

***********

There’s lots to say about this season for Cardiff, but if you watched the game at Brentford on Tuesday night then you probably know all you need to know about how Cardiff play.

That’s not meant as a flippant way to disregard Cardiff’s performances, it’s just that game probably replicates the vast amount of games the Bluebirds have played this season.

The strategy under Neil Warnock is not necessarily pretty, but it is mightily effective.

It is reliant on stout, energetic, pressing defending and quick, direct attacks, often from long balls forward or powerful runs from the wings.

And then there are the set pieces, boy are there set pieces.

When Warnock took over early last season that was the first most noticeable change he made.

But it is not by luck Cardiff find themselves in the top two – despite what some would believe.

Anti-football?

Statistically they deserve to be there and I’ll break this down a bit why Cardiff are genuine.

Sure, the passing measures are pretty awful with the Bluebirds looking more like a relegation battler than a promotion candidate here.

Cardiff average 45.7% possession (fourth worst) and just 60% of passes are completed, the absolute lowest ratio in the division.

Unsurprisingly they’ve played the fewest short passes in the Championship 212, less than half the total of the top possession teams.

But Warnock does not care about possession – he cares about activity at each end of the pitch.

And in this regard whether you look at goals scored and conceded (fourth and top) or by expected goals – the numbers are clear, Cardiff are legit.

But how?

Cardiff are second in shots for per game (14.1), shots on target per game (5), and top in attempts generated from set pieces (5.3).

Meanwhile they are fourth best in shots conceded per game (11.2), and in the top group for shots on target conceded.

So, they concede few shots and take plenty. And then add-in the locations of those to give a sign of Cardiff’s dominance.

The Bluebirds take 10% of their attempts on goal in the six-yard box (joint highest with Wolves) and 55% within the rest of the 18-yard box, third best.

At the other end, just 6% of shots conceded are taken by opponents in the six-yard box (5^th best), with the remaining locations at mid-table rates.

Finally, we get to set pieces, where Cardiff really stand out.

Cardiff have scored 18 goals from set pieces (joint top with Wolves) and conceded just 7 (joint top with a couple of other teams).

Depth to the strategy

Don’t be fooled into thinking Warnock is just a hit and hope long ball merchant.

Sure, the strategy has an element of that, but it is designed to clear balls from Cardiff’s defensive third quickly and put pressure on opposing defenders with strong, quick wingers or forwards chasing down.

Most of these don’t work admittedly, but the tactic does not allow defenders to switch off or make a mistake at any time in the game.

Think you’re in good shape with the ball on the edge of Cardiff’s area?

Bang!

Seconds later you’ve got a winger and forward bearing down on you with a ball bouncing around in no-man’s land.

Do you stick or twist? Get that wrong and another second later it’s in your net.

Likewise at set pieces there is subtle complexity designed, with flick-ons and targeted headers across goal all painstakingly setup on the training ground – this isn’t just hit it into the box and hope stuff.

Think the shortest player on the pitch isn’t a threat? Wait until he’s heading the flick-on back across goal from the far post after cutting in from the side of the box.

Play with the ball

This team can also play with the ball too, they just choose to do it in the final third.

Junior Hoilett has been one of the biggest threats in the Championship this season while the currently injured Joe Ralls is, in my mind, as good as any central midfielder in the division.

This pair can press and disrupt the opposition or work openings through tight defences and hit quickly on the counter.

And with Kenneth Zohore back and seemingly up to last season’s pace there is a real goal threat.

Custom-built player

But I’ll end this preview with probably Cardiff’s most important player this season – captain and central defender Sean Morrison.

As impressive as Sol Bamba, Bruno Manga and the rest of the defence have been, Morrison is that cut above.

He takes control of situations, is rarely out of position and wins countless headers and tackles and clearances, not to mention chipping in with the odd goal or two.

If Neil Warnock could forge his own custom-built player I suspect it would look a lot like the Cardiff captain.

And so, although the Bluebirds were due a dip in form, it’s probably not a coincidence Cardiff’s poor run around Christmas and New Year happened during his absence.

Has Neil Warnock improved Cardiff?

When Paul Trollope was sacked as Cardiff manager the team was languishing in 23rd place heading for a relegation fight.

Eight weeks later with Neil Warnock in charge, the club is still languishing in 22nd place now very much in a relegation fight with almost half the season gone.

So was it worth it? Has Warnock improved results and performances?

First off, Trollope’s team had amassed just eight points in those 11 games – a rate of 0.73 points per game. Extend that over a full season and it becomes around 33 points – nailed on relegation and quite possibly bottom in some years.

Warnock has flipped those numbers, 11 points in eight games, good for 1.375 points per game. Again if we extrapolate that over a whole season we get 63 points – comfortably top half of the table and potentially just a win or two from being in the playoffs.

Most importantly however, if we extend Warnock’s 1.375 ppg over the whole of the season from him joining we get 48 points.
That in itself should be enough to keep Cardiff out of the relegation zone (just), but added to Trollope’s eight points the Bluebirds should be on course for a steady bottom half finish.

Now this haul has come over a small sample of just eight games – a lucky win here or there can wildly skew the ppg totals – so can we be sure Warnock has improved performances to justify these results?

I'm exiled at the moment, so just watching the couple of televised matches under Warnock it’s been a far better looking Cardiff team than with Trollope, but does that translate into actual solid data? (Remember, appearances can be deceiving.)

Well, yes it does.

Attacking efficiency

Let’s consider the attacking side first.
Warnock has made Cardiff’s attack quite a bit more efficient. Despite cutting down the number of shots Cardiff take per game by roughly 1.5 when at 11v11, the number of those that are not blocked by defenders and that then make it on target has remained almost unchanged.

(click the image for a bigger version)

Looking at locations (under all game states), Warnock has cut down almost two shots per game from outside the box and instead added an extra shot from inside. The biggest increase has been headed attempts from inside the six-yard-box. (Somewhat reassuringly, this is true to form for Warnock and meets what he did at Rotherham last season, as I mentioned in my preview piece upon his hiring.)

While headers are far less effective for goal scoring than shots, if you are going to make them a focus of your attack then you want to do so from as close range as possible. Whether this has been initiated by the types of opportunities created, better crossing, or position of attacking players, it is a welcome improvement that has already yielded two goals from this area.


Overall, although there are improvements, as I wrote previously, this is still a below average Championship attack which relies too heavily on headed attempts and still needs further work to open defences and create chances regularly.

Defensive stability

Given the attacking shortcomings this means the defence has to be above average just to keep its head above water. Warnock has improved on what was a roughly league average unit to make it a well above average group under his charge.

Warnock’s removed a full 2.5 attempts from inside the box during his reign and given up just 1.5 more from outside – a more than fair exchange by anyone’s reckoning.
He’s improved an already strong aerial defence, but most encouragingly Cardiff have cut out almost a full shot per game from both the central and side areas of the 18-yard-box.

Cardiff now concede just 2.25 (foot) shots per game from the danger zone of six-yard-box and central 18-yard-box, well below the league average of 2.95 per game.
Incidentally, the Bluebirds also take 2.25 shots from the danger zone area each game, so a deficit of almost one shot per game in this area under Trollope has been equalised.

In all, Cardiff’s defence has changed from allowing more shots from better locations than the league average under Trollope, to allowing fewer shots from far more distant locations under Warnock.
(I was hesitant about Warnock’s defensive potential in my earlier piece, but I am very pleased to say he has far outperformed my prediction.)

Overall performance

Looking at the overall shot shares under the two managers, we can see Warnock has made noticeable improvements in terms of all shots, unblocked shots, shots on target and goals for.
The team is at least league average in these markers now and better still when the scores are level.

Shooting % (the rate at which shots on target are scored) is typically around 30% within the Championship – although this can be subject to significant short term volatility.

Trollope, perhaps being a victim of poor shooting locations, had a rate of just 22%, while Warnock has had shots being scored at an above average 40%, again perhaps influenced by the improved (though still not great) locations. I would not expect this to continue long term, though the short term correction is much appreciated.

Likewise, goalkeeper save% (the rate at which goalkeepers save shots on target) can be volatile and also dependent on shot location.

Again Warnock’s improved defence may well tell part of the story in this improvement.
However, it is well worth noticing that both Trollope and Warnock’s save% are well below the 70% league average, and it is hard not to wonder if selling TWO first team goalkeepers in the summer without recruiting a suitable replacement may be significantly hindering Cardiff’s progress.

Encouraging signs

Perhaps most encouragingly for Cardiff fans, this improvement in shot shares is seen throughout all score states.
This means the team is able to hold its own or even control the balance of shots when the game is there for the winning, not just when several goals down and the opposition are sitting back. And when ahead it means Cardiff are as likely (or more so) to score a second than concede an equaliser.

Also encouragingly, Warnock has faced a reasonably stiff set of fixtures during his time, including five of the top six teams in terms of 11v11 shots on target share – one of the better statistical predictors of team quality and future success.

The signs for Cardiff are more positive under Warnock and with the whole bottom half of the table (Rotherham excluded) so tight, a couple of wins could easily see the Bluebirds as high as 15th.

Of course football has its shock results (such as Blackburn winning at Newcastle last week) and being dragged into a relegation battle can have unanticipated effects on players and management, but I am now far more confident that Cardiff will be sitting away from the relegation zone in May than I was under Trollope.

Can Neil Warnock turnaround Cardiff City?

It's been quite a while since my last post, here's hoping I can make it more regular for the rest of the season.

The Severnside derby kicks off the return of the Championship.
Like most local derbies it draws a decent amount of attention and this one has the added Wales vs England element too.
However this one is likely to attract a bit more scrutiny given the events at Cardiff during the international break.

Paul Trollope lasted 11 games in charge and in some respects its surprising he lasted that long.
I'm not usually one for sacking a manager early but in Trollope's case I'm not convinced it was going to work out.
He'd already switched from his initial 5-3-2 formation and tactics, and credit to him for that, but according to the data things were getting worse, not better.

It’s a shame it ended this way as statistically speaking, the season appeared to have started fairly well.
For the first six weeks Cardiff had a decent overall shots on target share above 50% at 11v11 and at level score situations.
However, the Bluebirds' all shot share (Corsi/TSR) only once made it above 50% either under all conditions or at level score situations.

But (poor) shot quality matters.

And when we look deeper into the data we can see why the results did not reflect this limited early season promise.
Trollope's attack, whether by design or simply through not having any other options, had been focused on headed and long range attempts at goal.
While a varied attack can prove profitable (see Brighton), Cardiff have exchanged a sizeable amount of shots from prime positions into headed attempts.
This is not a good exchange to make.

By week 11, Cardiff had taken the third fewest footed attempts at goal in the danger zone (six-yard box and centre of the 18-yard box) in the division - only Rotherham and Ipswich have taken fewer.
Despite being middle of the pack defensively, Cardiff have the joint fifth worst danger zone shot difference - again Ipswich and Rotherham are two of the teams below them.

Looking at the headed attempts at goal, the situation is give-or-take a near perfect mirror image.
Cardiff have the directed the third most headers at goal (behind only Barnsley and Aston Villa), and have conceded the third fewest.

While it may delight commentators to regularly swing the ball into the box, such a one-sided attack does not usually prove effective as headers are much less likely to be scored than attempts from the feet.
Sadly, Cardiff have the second lowest % of their shot attempts being taken from the centre of the 18-yard box (Ipswich lowest).

In fact, Cardiff have been making almost two thirds (63%) of their attempts on goal as headers outside the six-yard box or shots from outside the 18-yard box.
It is entirely possible that taking so many attempts from poor locations is playing a part in the awful shooting % figure.
By contrast, Cardiff have forced just 56% of attempts at goal from these poorer locations.



So instead we have Neil Warnock joining the show.

Personality-wise, Warnock has had something of a love-hate relationship with Cardiff fans. He’s generally been complimentary about the club and its fans, but during his travels around the league he’s managed to rub a lot of Bluebirds up the wrong way.
Still, this isn’t a popularity contest – this is, of course, a results driven business and following guiding Rotherham to safety last year and his wealth of previous experience, Warnock would seem to be an obvious choice.

But how much of last year’s great escape was down to Warnock’s influence and is he likely to have a similar effect on Cardiff?
Well, having gone through the data I’m not convinced Warnock had that big an effect on Rotherham’s survival.
He took over from Neil Redfearn after 30 games with Rotherham battling Bolton, MK Dons and Charlton to avoid relegation.

Credit where it's due?

In the end the Millers completed the task relatively easily (nine points above safety), but I suspect that may be as much down to the awfulness of the other three teams as to Warnock’s magic.
As you can see in the chart below, at level score Rotherham’s all shot share (Corsi/TSR) and unblocked shots share (Fenwick) remained pretty unchanged from Warnock’s start to the end of the season.
There was a slight uptick in shots on target share (green line) but this still never broke the 45% mark – hardly earth shattering but useful at the bottom of the table.

The biggest changes, however, came in the rate Rotherham scored their goals and kept them out.
The Millers’ combined shooting % and save % (PDO) was its lowest of the season (just) when Warnock took over – 17 points below league average.
By the end of the season Rotherham’s PDO had made up 15 points of this difference – with the save % being the main benefactor by more than 10 points.
And it’s so much easier to win games sneaking the odd goal when you’re not shipping them constantly.
Combined with a smaller but important increase of five points in shooting % and Rotherham were just a shade under league average in these key metrics by the end of the season.




So could Warnock have instilled a tactical change to improve these measures?

Well, in all his changes gave Rotherham one extra shot from the centre of the 18-yard box per 7.5 games… so two more shots from this area during his spell in charge than Redfearn would have expected.
But there were ten extra headers inside the six-yard box compared to Redfearn and shots taken from outside the 18-yard box were cut down significantly.
So it is possible this could have accounted for the increase in shooting %.

How about defensively?

Well, aside from a very small drop in the number of headers allowed inside the six-yard box, this does not make great reading.
Warnock’s team conceded more shots per game from the centre of the 18-yard box (+0.5), the sides of the box (+0.24) and outside (+0.9) than Redfearn’s side averaged.
The increase in shots outside the box would be far less of a concern if it meant shots inside the box were being pushed out, but this did not happen.
Of course, the situations may have been different – perhaps Warnock’s defensive system meant opposition players were closed down more frequently when taking shots resulting in poor quality chances.

However, there’s little evidence in my data to suggest anything other than a more normal save % and shooting % driven recovery.
Indeed, at level score under Warnock 35% of shots on target taken were hitting the back of the net and more than 86% of shots on target conceded were saved – both way above league averages of 30%-70%.

For Cardiff fans, it seems that it might be a case of more of the same as regards the aerial based attack, although there may be a focus to not shoot from distance so much.
Also, it is probably fair to say that Cardiff's squad is more talented than Rotherham's (especially given the free agent signings made in the last week) so one would hope Warnock can get more out of this talent.
But perhaps its most notable that in this young season Cardiff have the second lowest shooting % and save %, to give a PDO of just 78.44 – lowest in the entire division by some way.
It’s safe to say the team is due something of a rebound, how much we will have to wait and see.